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Art. V.—ON MIND. 
By J. L. Teed, M. D., Kansas City, Mo. 
TT'NQUIRIES into the nature of mind have attracted the 
J—i attention of thinking men in all ages of which we have 
any record. The phenomena of consciousness, of reflection, of 
memory, and of volition, differ in their manifestations so im¬ 
mensely from all the phenomena of surrounding nature, that 
it would be indeed strange if they had not attracted this atten¬ 
tion; while the apparent difficulties of the problem, the scanty 
knowledge of the phenomena of nature, the generally imper¬ 
fect methods of investigation, and the dominance of certain 
hypotheses, have caused most enquirers to make the facts 
observed square with the preconceived ideas, rather than to 
simply observe the facts, and make their preconceived ideas 
harmonize with them. 
One source of error has been commingling religion with 
science. The ban of materialism, of infidelity, or of atheism 
has for ages been unsparingly pronounced against those who 
have by patient study, and the examination of natural phe¬ 
nomena, attempted to solve the mystery of mind. It is doubt¬ 
less true that materialists, infidels and atheists have been at¬ 
tracted by the intricacy of the subject, and have fondly but 
vainly hoped to find its solution; but they have also investi¬ 
gated the problems of mathematics, as well as those of mind, 
and the mere fact, that the former have been investigated by 
them, has been no deterrent to other investigations, nor need 
we be deterred on such grounds from scientific investigations 
into the latter. Yet it does seem strange, that while all the 
other works of the Creator are considered objects of legitimate 
study, this should be placed beyond the pale of legitimate en¬ 
quiry. 
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Another source of error lies 5n the use of the terms mind, 
soul, and spirit, as synonymous; for a6 we have no means by 
which we can investigate the two latter, by such an idea we 
prevent any investigation of the former; no greater obstacle 
lies in the way of our accomplishing any object, than the firm 
conviction that such a result is impossible. 
A kindred source of error is the idea that the mind properly 
so called is an attribute of the soul and not of the body; and 
this is largely prevalent at the present day. Observation daily 
teaches that the lower animals possess many of those qualities 
the aggregate of which make up that complex which we call 
mind; and as it has not been possible to allow to these lower 
animals the possession of souls, the same phenomena when 
manifested by them have been termed instinct, when mani¬ 
fested by man, mind; and thus still more confusion has been 
introduced into the subject. 
The mode of investigation followed has been a frequent 
source of error. No one is likely to be attracted by this sub¬ 
ject, until he has reached years of mature thought. He then 
commences to analyze his own thoughts, his own feelings. He 
finds he can at will direct his thoughts into this or that chan¬ 
nel; he can recall events, persons, and things by memory; he 
can learn one subject after another by application ; he per¬ 
ceives external objects; he forms abstract ideas, or rather con¬ 
crete ideas with such faint boundary lines as to appear to him 
abstract; he measures time and space, and the size and com¬ 
position of distant worlds; and he naturally enquires, how and 
by what means are these things done? Instead of attempting 
the problem in its earliest, he tries to grasp it in its most fully 
developed and expanded state. Is it any wonder that he fails? 
Look at the works of art scattered throughout the length and 
breadth of the world! Examine the treasures of science in the 
cumulated libraries of nations, all the products of mighty 
mind ; and is it any wonder that the investigation of this power 
in its most developed form should be as much beyond hiscom- 
prehension, as it would be impossible for him to produce all 
these results? 
As one observer fails by introspection to solve the problem, 
another attempts its solution by analyzing the character of 
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others. He studies biography, history, and perhaps also 
works of fiction devoted to the portrayment of character. He 
divides the phenomena of mind into fractional parts, and en¬ 
deavors to assign to eacli its share in the elucidation of the sub¬ 
ject, But he is studying results of menial action, not mind; 
he may learn the relation between external conditions and 
states of mind, but he gains no knowledge of the nature of 
mind itself. 
Others again have sought to investigate the subject by ob¬ 
serving it in its more simple or lower forms, as manifested by 
the lower animals; but these investigations have only served 
hitherto to render the subject more obscure, from thediffieulty 
of determining where mind begins, and from the absence of 
any term whereby we can express those conditions of activity, 
in which the development of mind has not been reached, but 
which lie, as it were, in the border-land between the mental and 
the non-mental. 
The study of mind in those unfortunates who are the sub¬ 
jects of mental alienation, has hitherto thrown no light on the 
subject; nor, indeed, should we expect that disordered mani¬ 
festations of mind could be more easily explained than are its 
healthy and normal manifestations. It is a general rule, that 
the healthy condition must be understood before the diseased 
condition can be comprehended, and the subject of mind forms 
no exception to this rule. Yet it is in this direction that we 
may expect the greatest advances will be made in the future; 
and the explorer will come, who shall discover the connection 
between diseased states and abnormal mental action, between 
healthy states and normal mental action. 
But the greatest obstacle to the comprehension of mind has 
hitherto lain in the extremely slight acquaintance previously 
had with the general phenomena of nature. In fact, it is only 
since attention has been directed to the study of force, as well 
as to the study of matter, that the clue to a correct idea of the 
phenomena of mind has been placed within our reach; while 
by the application of the phenomena of force the problem re¬ 
ceives a simple solution which is fitted to all its conditions, in¬ 
volves no contradictions, raises no conflict with religion, and 
promotes the highest object of humanity, our endeavors to 
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discover how, by suitable treatment, we may restore the sanity 
of healtli to a mind diseased. 
Many are the scenes of sorrow and suffering on which the 
sun shines in his daily course, but the saddest of all are those 
groups of poor unfortunates collected within the walls of our 
lunatic asylums. The fond father, the affectionate wife, the 
loving child, the accomplished ornament of society, all stripped 
of their attractions, and transformed by a terrible disease 
into objects of dread, requiring incarceration for the general 
protection of life and property. And surely, any investiga¬ 
tion, however humble it may be, as is this one now before us, 
deserves an examination, if by any means it may be found to 
throw the least light on the nature of the malady with which 
they are affected, or to indicate a direction for its pathological 
or its clinical investigation. 
The term mind may be used correctly in two senses; one 
potential, the other actual. Mind, in the potential sense, indi¬ 
cates the capability of forming an idea; in the actnal sense, 
the idea formed. It may be also used in a general or compre¬ 
hensive sense to mean an aggregation of ideas. 
The fundamental facts in the phenomena of mind are there¬ 
fore, first, an idea; second, the formation of an idea. If, there¬ 
fore, we can arrive at a scientific comprehension of one idea, 
and can trace the process of its formation, through its various 
stages, we gain an insight into all mental operations, and thus 
reduce this subject to the ordinary condition of our present 
knowledge of all abstract subjects. 
An idea is not the thing itself, but it is a representation of 
the thing; it therefore requires for its formation the previous 
existence of the thing itself of which it is the representation; 
this representation is accomplished within ns, and is the result 
of the dynamic transmission to us of the qualities possessed 
by the object; it may be defined as the perceived image of any 
object; the term image being used to express the same relation 
to the other senses as in the limited sense it has to vision. 
In order to trace the formation of .an idea, it is best to study 
the process in a being in whom ideation (or mind) exists po¬ 
tentially but not actually; in one whose mind is as yet unde¬ 
veloped, wlio, not yet possessed of ideas, is, however, capable 
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of forming them; and such a being we find in the human 
infant. 
When born, the infant lias no ideas, no knowledge; no im¬ 
pressions have been made on its sensory organs, for these ave¬ 
nues to the brain have all been closed, or placed beyond the 
reach of such impressions. Directly after birth, however, it 
comes in contact with external agencies, of which the cold at¬ 
mosphere is one. The consequent rapid conduction of heat 
from its general surface produces the impression of cold; this 
produces contraction of the muscles of respiration, a breath 
and a cry follow, and this cry is the result of the first idea. 
Although cold is a negative, and therefore does not actually 
exist, yet in common language we. use it as a positive, and 
speak of its effects. The effects of cold and heat on the ex¬ 
tremities of sensory nerves are similar to one another, only in 
the first ease the current of the molecular motion produced in 
the neurine is from within outwards, in the second case from 
without inwards; according as heat is either given off or 
absorbed. 
This molecular motion thus produced in the infant is trans¬ 
mitted through the neurine of its nerve trunks to certain col¬ 
lections of nerve cells reaching through the entire length of 
its spinal cord to the basal ganglia in its brain; it is thence 
transmitted to the cells of its cerebral hemispheres, and in 
these cells the impression becomes a perception or idea, which 
then, as all through life, is of the unpleasant kind, and pro¬ 
duces those muscular contractions which give rise to ejacula¬ 
tory expressions and jactitations of the limbs. If the infant 
be now wrapped in flannel, and lain in a warm place, it soon 
ceases its crying and lies quiet; the molecular motion is suc¬ 
ceeded by molecular rest, and a feeling of well being is pro¬ 
duced. 
The first idea, therefore, formed in the infant is the differ¬ 
ence between cold and heat, and with it the emotional differ¬ 
ence between comfort and discomfort; and it manifests its cog¬ 
nizance of these conditions by its positive cries or its negative 
quiet, the only means it has of expressing its feelings. 
After some time the infants’ eyes become accustomed to the 
stimulus of sight, and it begins to look at surrounding objects. 
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The rays of light reflected from the surfaces of these bodies 
fall on its retina, and their motion becomes the source of mo¬ 
tion in the nervous expansion of this membrane. The motion 
of the ray of light, which motion we will designate A, infring¬ 
ing on the retina the motion in which B becomes the impres¬ 
sion, thence the motion is continued to the corpora quadrigem- 
ina, and there as' C becomes tbe sensation; from this point 
the motion is transmitted to the angular gyrus, in which as D 
it becomes perception of vision or light, which is attended 
with consciousness, and is, therefore, the idea of the thing 
seen. The first and the last terms of the series A and D are 
therefore similars, the difference between them being due to 
the matter by or through which the motion is manifested, and 
not to any change in the intrinsic nature of the force itself; 
and thus the idea of vision or sight is motion in the neurine 
of the angular gyrus. 
We may trace the formation of ideas in the brain through 
each avenue of the five senses, and we shall find the process 
just the same in each. An external motion is arrested by the 
extremity of a sensory nerve, in which it produces a similar 
motion—that is, a motion vibratory in its character; this mo¬ 
tion is then transmitted or continued along the neurme of the 
nerve trunk to the vesicular cells in which it terminates; the 
motion is thence transmitted to more distant, or as we say, 
higher centres, and thus reaching the acme of the trajectory 
becomes the phenomenon of mind. 
But each one of the senses has its own special line of neurine 
from the periphery to the centre, and these different tracts of 
neurine are not adapted for the reception, transmission, or per¬ 
ception of any but one particular form or mode of motion. 
Thus the angular gyrus can interpret the motion of the ray of 
light into sight but no other motion; the superior temporo- 
sphenoidal gyrus can interpret the motion of sound into hear¬ 
ing but no other, and so on with the other senses. And just 
as in-going currents, giving rise to perceptions, are found to 
have definite tracts, each for each, so the out-going currents, 
giving rise to volitional motions, are also found to have defi¬ 
nite tracts, each for each; and thus we may conclude that an 
idea, of whatever kind it may be, is motion in a correspond- 
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ing group of cortical nerve cells in the hemisphere of the 
brain. 
The cells of the brain centers are of three kinds—sensory, 
ideational and motor; therefore the only proof of the posses¬ 
sion of mind is the presence of ideational nerve cells, for as 
cross lines of communication are frequently passing from the 
sensory to the motor tracts, movement in response to sensation 
may be of the automatic or reflex kind; and this may be the 
highest point reached in development by animals low in the 
scale of being. 
Let us now briefly examine the sources of ideas. 
What is sight? A vibratory motion among the particles of 
the luminous body. 
What is sound? A vibratory motion among the particles 
of the sonorous body. 
What is heat? A vibratory motion among the particles of 
the candescent body. 
Taste, smell and touch are in the same way special modes or 
forms of motion. Abolish motion and there is no longer any 
manifestation of force of any kind, nor can there then be any 
means through which by us can any idea be formed. But as 
the first transmutation of the external motion constitutes the 
impression, so the last transmutation of this motion consti¬ 
tutes the idea, and if this last transmutation can not, from any 
cause, be accomplished, the idea can never be formed. 
No idea can be formed except as the result of its antecedent 
motion. We can no more create a new idea than we could 
create the material basis of which this idea would be the type, 
for all our ideas are representative types or images of external 
things, and they all require a material basis for their formation. 
The idea of a horse requires the horse ; the idea of love, of 
hope or of joy, requires the person loving, hopeful or joyful. 
Of an abstract we can form no idea, for the abstract is absolute; 
and all our knowledge being relative, the abstract has neither 
differences nor resemblances; these belong to the concrete, and 
the concrete always has a material personification. 
No idea can be separated from its external motion, whether 
causative or derivative; we cannot think of an external object, 
without such object being brought into internal consciousness 
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or imagery; nor can we think of any movement withont such 
movement being brought into internal imagery. We cannot 
think of motion, except of a body moving; of rest, except of a 
bod}' resting; thus again the abstract to be thought of has to 
be clothed in concrete form. 
The transmission of these molecular movements is not always 
accomplished with the same facility, and thus we find a greater 
readiness of comprehension in some than in others, and in the 
same person at different times and in different periods of his 
existence. And not only is there a difference in the inception 
of these movements, but the same is found in the re-establish¬ 
ment of these movements, whence arises a difference in the 
memory of different persons. 
The vividness of the idea will bear a direct relation to the 
intensity of the motion produced in ideational nerve (jells; 
while of course the nature of the idea will depend upon the 
group of nerve cells thrown into activity. 
By an act of volition we call these definite groups of nerve 
cells into activity, whether sensory, ideational or motor; and 
so also by act of volition we can repress this activity; and 
we find this power of volitional ideation in all the forms of 
animal life possessed of what we term mind. We also find 
that these conditions of molecular movement are closely con¬ 
nected with other somatic conditions. The timidity of some 
forms of cardiac disease, the hopefulness of some forms of 
pulmonary disease, and the melancholy of some forms of gastric 
and hepatic disease have long been subjects of observation. 
They are also much influenced by conditions of the blood, 
whether such take the form of abnormal cpiantity or of abnormal 
quality. They are also much influenced by the introduction 
of certain material substances into the blood, such as haschisli, 
opium, alcohol, tea, coffee, etc., etc. And we also find that 
they are much influenced by the intrinsic conditions of the 
nerve cells themselves. Thus, the mens san/i in cor pore sano 
is no fiction; it is one of those realities, the importance of 
which is hardly thought of until a disturbance of this function 
brings it vividly into view. Yet there never was a case,of in¬ 
sanity, or of delirium, that did not have its inception in some 
form of somatic disturbance. 
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Another fact, now too well established to admit of doubt, is 
the transmission of neurotic disorder, which often assumes the 
ideational form, by a parent to the offspring, after a change 
from sober to drunken habits; those children born during the 
sober period not being so affected. While another fact equally 
striking, but which, like the one just mentioned, lias never 
received its due consideration in the investigations on this 
subject, is the one, that transmitted neurotic disorder may as¬ 
sume either the sensory form or the motor form, as well as the 
ideational form, or be compounded of all these forms, thus 
showing the intimate relation existing between the various 
functions of nerve matter, sensation, ideation and motion. 
In offering this explanation of the phenomena of mind, it 
must be remembered that we are considering them as we find 
them manifested by living men and living animals. Allow¬ 
ing that there are modes of existence purely spiritual, un¬ 
clothed with the habiliments of matter, the phenomena, which 
they exhibit, analogous to those of mind in us and in the lower 
animals, must rest on a basis adapted to their particular mode 
of existence, as the phenomena of mind rest on a'basis adapted 
to that particular mode of existence which we possess in com¬ 
mon with the lower animals. But those analogous phenomena 
cannot be literally included under the term mind, unless we 
also suppose that those modes of existence possess ideational 
nerve cells, by which such phenomena may be manifested, al¬ 
though figuratively we use this word mind by which to express 
them, because we have no other word in our language adapted 
to this purpose. 
The peculiar differences manfested by different classes of the 
lower animals depetid doubtless upon certain definite variances 
in the cortical nerve cells of their brains; and in the same way 
we may account for those innate variances in character, co-equal 
in number with the individuals of the human family. But in¬ 
nate character must not be confounded with acquired charac¬ 
ter. As we found in volition the power to act, so we also 
found in it the power to restrain from acting. If a man exer¬ 
cise these powers in certain directions he acquires a character 
for honesty and sobriety; if he refuse to exercise these powers, 
he acquires a character directly the reverse; and thus we speak 
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of men as depraved or of no moral worth. Thus the explana¬ 
tion of the phenomena of mind here offered gives no argument 
in favor either of immorality, or of nnaccountability for our 
actions. Our duties in these directions are left untouched by 
it. If it should be that the difficulty of so restraining is 
greater in onS than in another, it is no more than we observe 
in the other mental phenomena, for though one man can exer¬ 
cise his brain better on some subjects than on others, yet by 
perseverance he can acquire a considerable degree of proficiency 
on those subjects which he finds the greatest difficnlty in ac¬ 
quiring. 
Neither does this explanation of the phenomena of mind 
give any argument in favor of materialism, nor is it opposed in 
any way to the generally received doctrines of religion. For by 
separating the mind from all controversies respecting the soul, 
and restricting its meaning to a function of the bod)', or of a 
part of it, we absolutely exclude all religious matter from be¬ 
ing involved in the discussion, as well as all questions of a 
metaphysical character. Although the word mind may be used 
metaphorically, as is the word heart, such use of a word is 
never supposed to convey its absolute meaning. 
But this explanation brings us into a more humanitarian re¬ 
lation with all forms of insanity and delirium, whether they 
are presented to us in a medico-legal, or in a purely medical 
form. It is no more a disgrace to a family to have one of its 
members insane, than it is to another family to have one of its 
members blind, or deaf, or paralytic. The calamity, it is true, 
is greater; but that should only more deeply rouse our human 
sympathies. While if it be true that insanity is on the increase, 
it only teaches every one more strongly to look well to his 
habits of life, and to the preservation of his general health. 
But the great value of this explanation is in its truth, for 
all advance in science is chiefly accomplished by correction of 
error, and the establishment of relations between known facts. 
